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ABSTRACT
In a standard linear structural VAR framework we analyse the size and sign 
of fi scal multipliers in the euro area, using a newly available quarterly data-
set of fi scal variables for the period 1981-2007. From a policy perspective, 
the analysis of fi scal multipliers in “average times” provides insights on the 
impact of both fi scal stimulus and fi scal consolidation measures, provided 
“good” and “bad” times are on average similar.
* The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily refl ect those
of the European Central Bank, the Bank of Spain or the Eurosystem. We thank Pablo Hernández de 
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referee for useful comments. 
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RESUMEN
Por medio de un modelo VAR estructural lineal estándar, se analiza la 
magnitud y el signo de los multiplicadores fiscales para la zona euro, 
utilizando una base de datos trimestrales de variables fiscales para el período 
1981-2007 recientemente disponible. Desde una perspectiva política, el 
análisis de los multiplicadores fiscales en "tiempos normales" proporciona 
información detallada sobre el impacto tanto de medidas de estímulo fiscal y 
medidas de consolidación fiscal, a condición de que los períodos "buenos" y 
"malos" sean en promedio similares.
Palabras clave: Area Euro; SVAR; Shocks Fiscales; Multiplicadores Fiscales. 
I. INTRODUCTION
The discussion on the negative impact of fiscal consolidation mea-
sures is nowadays extremely topical, as it was slightly more than half a 
year ago the symmetric discussion on the positive impact of discretionary 
fiscal measures to stimulate the economic activity implemented to soften 
the economic downturn. Indeed, by June 2009 almost all OECD economies 
and many emerging countries had announced or implemented some sort of 
fiscal stimulus packages. In the case of European economies, the European 
Commission launched at the end of 2008 the “European Economic 
Recovery Plan” (EERP), aimed at providing a coordinated fiscal stimulus 
for the European Union (EU) as a whole. Since the end of 2009 in some 
countries and more widespread in the course of 2010, the case for fi scal 
stimulus has turned into the case for fi scal consolidation.
The quantification of the potential negative effects of contractionary 
fiscal measures on the economy is now crucial. At first sight, given the 
quasi-agreement of both international organizations and academic econ-
omists on the beneficial effects of fiscal stimulus, one may guess that the 
symmetric policy should depress output.
At the current juncture, the economic impact of fi scal packages re-
mains uncertain. This is certainly the case for the euro area, given the scar-
city of relevant studies. Given the single monetary policy in the euro area 
since 1999, and the synchronization of monetary policies already since the 
JEL Classification: E62; H30.
Clasificación JEL: E62; H30. 
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beginning of the 1990's among core euro area countries, the aggregate 
analysis of fiscal policy shocks for the area as a whole is a pertinent 
endeavour. Even though fiscal policy has been a country-specific issue 
over the last two decades,1 the use of historical data in euro area wide 
models is of practical relevance for policy makers.2 And given the potential 
importance of spillover effects of fiscal policy in a highly integrated area 
such as the EMU, the results available for some specific countries3 do not 
necessarily provide a good guidance for analysing the macroeconomic 
impact of fiscal shocks in the euro area as a whole. 
Thus, the main aim of this paper is to assess the impact of fi scal poli-
cy shocks in a (weighed) representative euro area country (the euro area ag-
gregate) on infl ation and GDP, the key macroeconomic variables of interest 
for the ECB. We focus on the sample 1981-2007.4
Along the lines of the most recent and standard strand of the literature 
that started with Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the effects of fi scal policy 
shocks area assessed within a SVAR framework where identifi cation of fi s-
cal policy shocks is achieved by exploiting decision lags in policy making 
and information about the elasticity of fi scal variables to economic activity. 
Along the lines of our broader study Burriel et al. (2010), we focus on a 
standard methodology for comparability with previous results for other ar-
eas/countries. Thus, we aim at capturing the average impact of fi scal policies 
on GDP. Clearly, our analysis leaves aside the likely non-linear responses of 
consumers to changes in policies and differences in the extant policy regime 
1. This has been the case even under the operation of the Stability and Growth Pact, the fi scal
policies’ coordination agreement in place in the EU since 1999.
2. See, for instance, Smets and Wouters (2003, 2005), Fagan et al. (2005), Christoffel et al. 
(2008) and Ratto et al. (2009).
3. For euro area country studies see Heppke-Falk et al. (2006) for Germany, de Castro (2006)
and de Castro and Hernández de Cos (2008) for Spain, Giordano et al. (2007) for Italy, Marcellino 
(2006) for the four largest countries of the euro area or Afonso and Sousa (2009a, 2009b) for 
Germany, Italy and Portugal, and Bénassy-Quéré and Cimadomo (2006) and Beetsma and Giuliodori 
(2009) for a group of EU countries. On different grounds, Jacobs et al. (2007) incorporate a fi scal 
closure rule in a VAR for the euro area.
4. The scarcity of results analysing the impact of fi scal shocks for the euro area as a whole and
the countries thereof, is ultimately due to the lack of quarterly data for the general government sec-
tor. In fact, until very recently, official data following national accounts conventions for the EMU 
and the countries comprising it, covering a wide set of variables, were only available in non-
seasonally adjusted terms for the period 1999Q1 onwards. This limitation has been recently 
overcome by Paredes et al. (2009) that provide a quarterly fiscal database for the euro area 
aggregate for the period 1980Q1-2007Q4. The raw ingredients they use are closely linked to the 
ones used by national statistical agencies to provide their best estimates (intra-annual fiscal data, 
mostly on a cash basis), and they preserve full coherence with official, annual data.
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(periods of expansionary fi scal policy vs periods of fi scal consolidation un-
der fi scal stress) that might turn out to be crucial to rationalize the impact of 
fi scal policies in “good” and “bad” times.
We fi nd for the euro area standard qualitative responses of GDP and 
infl ation to government spending and net-tax shocks. Our results are within 
the standard ranges of results obtained in similar empirical studies for the 
US and euro area countries.5 To make it short: expansionary fi scal shocks do 
have a short-term positive impact on GDP and private consumption, with 
government spending shocks entailing, in general, higher effects on eco-
nomic activity than (net) tax reductions.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 describes the 
data, section 3 methodological issues and section 4 the results. Finally, we 
present some concluding remarks in section 5.
II. THE DATA
As in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004), the baseline 
VAR estimated in this paper includes quarterly data on public expenditure 
(gt), net taxes (tt) and GDP (yt), all in real terms,6 the GDP defl ator (pt) and the 
ten-year interest rate of government bonds (rt).7 All variables are seasonally 
adjusted and enter in logs except the interest rate, which enters in levels. 
The defi nition of fi scal variables follows Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002). In particular, government spending (gt) is defi ned as the sum of 
government consumption and investment, while net taxes (tt) are defi ned 
as total government current receipts, less current transfers and interest pay-
ments on government debt.8 The reason for this grouping is that government 
spending on goods and services might have different effects, as it affects di-
rectly the aggregate demand of the economy, while transfers and taxes exert 
their effects through real disposable income that could be partially saved. 
These defi nitions have become commonplace in the most recent empirical 
literature. Given this defi nitions, the general government primary balance is 
5. For a discussion on fi scal multipliers in simulation models see Cwik and Wieland (2009) and 
Cogan et al. (2009).
6. In all cases the GDP defl ator is employed so as to obtain the corresponding real values.
7. The long-term interest rate is preferred to the short-term one because of its closer relationship 
with private consumption and investment decisions. However, this choice turned out to be immate-
rial to the results in that the inclusion of short-term rates in the VAR led to similar conclusions. 
8. More concretely, transfers include all expenditure items except public consumption, public
investment and interest payments.
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obtained as the difference between the levels of tt and gt. We use data cover-
ing the period 1981:Q1 to 2007:Q4. 
Fiscal data have been taken from a newly available quarterly fi scal 
data set compiled by Paredes et al. (2009). They employ intra-annual fi scal 
data, mostly on a cash basis, in a mixed-frequencies state space model to 
obtain quarterly fi scal data for the aforementioned period. These data ensure 
consistency with annual and quarterly national accounts data where avail-
able. The main advantage of the new Paredes et al. (2009) data set is that it 
avoids the endogenous bias that arises if fi scal data interpolated on the basis 
of general macroeconomic indicators were used with macroeconomic vari-
ables to assess the impact of fi scal policies. These variables are seasonally 
adjusted according to the statistical model used to draw the corresponding 
quarterly data.9 Other macroeconomic data for the euro area are taken from 
ECB’s Area Wide Model Database (see Fagan et al., 2005).
III. THE (S)VAR MODEL
III.1. Specifi cation
We apply the structural vector autoregressive approach proposed by 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004). The basic point in this ap-
proach is that identifi cation of fi scal policy shocks is achieved by exploiting 
decision lags in policy making and information about the elasticity of fi scal 
variables to economic activity. 
The reduced-form VAR is specifi ed in levels and can be written as 
ttt UXLDX += −1)( (1)
where Xt ≡ (gt , tt , yt , pt , rt) is the vector of endogenous variables and D(L) is an 
autoregressive lag polynomial. The benchmark specifi cation includes a con-
stant term, but no deterministic time trends. The vector Ut ≡ (u
g
t , u
t
t , u
y
t , u
p
t , u
r
t) 
contains the reduced-form residuals, which in general will present non-zero 
cross-correlations. The VAR includes two lags of each endogenous variable 
according to the information provided by LR tests, the Akaike, Schwarz and 
Hannan-Quinn information criteria and the fi nal prediction error.10 
9. Another alternative would consist in using TRAMO-SEATS (see Gómez and Maravall, 1996) 
to extract the seasonal component. 
10. In order to assess the robustness of our results to different specifi cations and transforma-
tions, we tried several alternatives, including estimating with variables in per capita terms, adding 
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III.2. Identifi cation strategy
The reduced-form residuals have little economic signifi cance in that 
they are linear combinations of structural shocks. In particular, the reduced-
form residuals of the gt and tt equations, u
g
t and u
t
t can be thought of as linear 
combinations of three types of shocks: a) The automatic responses of spend-
ing and net taxes to GDP, price and interest rate innovations, b) systematic 
discretionary responses of fi scal policy to the macro variables in the system 
(for instance, reductions in tax rates that some countries could implement 
systematically in response to recessions), and c) random discretionary fi s-
cal policy shocks, which are the truly uncorrelated structural fi scal policy 
shocks. Thus, from (1) the reduced-form residuals in the fi rst two equations 
can be expressed as:
 (2a)
and
 (2b)
where egt and e
t
t are the “structural” discretionary fiscal shocks. As we are 
interested in analysing the effects of egt and e
t
t, on the rest of the variables 
of the system, estimations for the αi,j’s and βi,j’s in (2) are needed. 
The approach we follow here is based on Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002). The key to this approach is the observation that approving and im-
plementing new measures in response to innovations in the main macroeco-
nomic variables typically takes longer than three months. Hence, the use 
of quarterly variables allows for setting the discretionary contemporaneous 
response of government expenditure or net taxes to GDP, prices or interest 
rate innovations to zero. Therefore, the coeffi cients αi,j’s in (2a) and (2b) 
only refl ect the automatic responses of fi scal variables to innovations in the 
rest of the variables of the system, the fi rst component aforementioned, and 
they can be estimated using institutional information on the elasticity of 
taxes and spending to GDP, prices and the interest rate. In particular, given 
that interest payments on government debt are excluded from the defi nitions 
of expenditure and net taxes, the semi-elasticities of these two fi scal vari-
ables to interest rate innovations, i.e. αg,r and αt,r, are set to zero. While this 
a time trend, allowing for four lags instead of two and substituting the long-term interest rate by 
a short-term one. These different alternatives showed broadly the same qualitative results and are 
available upon request.
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assumption appears justifi ed for government expenditure and plays no role 
when analysing its effects, it is slightly more controversial for net taxes.11 
Consider now equation (2a). Our choice of the items included in the 
defi nition of government expenditure, notably public consumption and in-
vestment, makes it hard to think about any automatic response of public 
expenditure to economic activity. Accordingly, we can set αg,y= 0. The case 
of the price elasticity is different, though. Some share of purchases of goods 
and services is likely to respond to the price level. In addition, the wage 
component is typically indexed (either formally or via ex-post adjustements) 
to the CPI, even though indexation takes place with some delay. Thus, we 
adopted the same eclectic approach as in Perotti (2004), according to which 
the price elasticity of government expenditure was set to -0.5. 
The output and price elasticities αi,j in (2b) are weighted averages of 
the elasticities of the different net-tax components, including transfers, com-
puted on the basis of information like statutory tax rates and estimations of 
the contemporaneous responses of the different tax-bases and, in the case of 
transfers, the relevant macroeconomic aggregate to GDP and price changes. 
In general, contemporaneous output elasticities of net taxes can be calcu-
lated as:
(3)
with T=∑Ti being the level of net taxes,12 εTi,Bi the elasticity of the ith 
category of net taxes to its own tax base and εBi,y the GDP elasticity of the 
tax base of the ith category of net taxes. Price elasticities for some 
components of net taxes were, however, obtained directly by econometric 
estimation, whereas others were calibrated. 
According to our estimations, output elasticity is 1.54, whereas price 
elasticity amounts 1.14.13 These elasticities are similar to those obtained in 
previous papers. For instance, Perotti (2004) gauges an output elasticity of 
1.97 for the USA (for the subsample 1980-2000), while the price elasticity is 
set to 1.4. There are no reference values for the euro area though. The closer 
11. In many cases, the income tax base includes interest income as well as dividends, which
in general co-vary negatively with interest rates. Nevertheless, the full set of effects of interest rate 
innovations on the different tax categories are very complex to analyse and, on the other hand, their 
contemporaneous effects are deemed to be very small.
12. The Ti’s are positive in the case of taxes and negative in the case of transfers.
13. Table A1 provides further details about the different elasticities behind these aggregate out-
put and price elasticities. 
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available results would be those for Germany, estimated at 0.72 and 0.98 in 
Heppke-Falk et al. (2006). The higher euro area results compared to Germany 
might indicate, among other factors, the presence of cross-country spill-over 
effects that potentially lead to higher multipliers than at the national level.
Once output and price elasticities have been estimated, the so-called 
“adjusted” fi scal shocks (uCA) can be derived as follows:
(3a)
  (3b)
As mentioned in Perotti (2004), there is little guidance, theoretical or em-
pirical, on how to identify the two structural shocks in (3a) and (3b), We 
assume that expenditure decisions are prior to tax ones, which implies a zero 
value for βg,t. This allows us to retrieve e
g
t directly from (3a) and to use it in 
(3b) in order to estimate βt,g by OLS.14 Since we are interested in studying 
the effects of fi scal policy shocks, the ordering of the remaining variables is 
immaterial to the results. Accordingly, the reduced-form output residuals are 
assumed to be a linear combination of the fi scal shocks. 
(4)
By defi nition, some contemporaneous correlation between the re-
duced-form residuals of the fiscal equations and eyt is expected. Hence (4) 
is estimated by instrumental variables, using the structural uncorrelated 
fiscal shocks egt and ett as instruments for u
g
t and u
t
t, respectively. Likewise, 
the coefficients of Γ corresponding to the price and interest rate equations 
can be obtained in turn in a similar way. 
The innovations model can be written as ΓUt=BVt, where Vt ≡ (e
g
t,e
t
t, 
eyt, e
p
t, e
r
t ) is the vector containing the orthogonal structural shocks. The re-
spective matrixes Γ and Β can be written as 
14. As shown in Perotti (2004), the correlation between the two cyclically adjusted fi scal shocks
is very low, so the ordering is immaterial for the results.
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(5)
Accordingly, the reduced-form residuals are linear combinations of the or-
thogonal structural shocks of the form Ut=Γ
-1BVt.
III.3. Possible weaknesses of the SVAR approach 
to model fi scal policy shocks
One frequent criticism to the identifi cation of quarterly fi scal policy 
shocks is that fi scal decisions are mainly taken on a year-by-year basis as em-
bedded in the budget. However, while acknowledging that the yearly budget 
incorporates important policy measures, supplements to it and other deci-
sions affecting fi scal policy during the year are always possible and, indeed, 
have been commonplace in most of the sample period under consideration. 
Another important criticism relates to implementation lags, i.e the 
typical long lag between the announcement of a fi scal measure, and the 
time the measure is actually adopted. Under rational expectations, econom-
ic agents adjust their decisions on consumption, saving and labour supply 
as soon as they have information on future changes in fi scal policy. If this 
is the case, the VAR-based estimated effects on the basis of quarterly data 
might be biased, although the sign of the bias is not clear. In particular, 
Ramey (2007) fi nds that failing to account for the anticipation effect causes 
the SVAR to capture shocks too late, missing some non-keynesian effects 
of fi scal policy (the initial decline in consumption that occurs as the news 
is known). By contrast, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Heppke-Falk et 
al. (2006) try to address this criticism including an indicator of future fi scal 
policy measures in their estimation procedure, fi nding qualitatively simi-
lar results. Perhaps, the existence of liquidity constrains or the presence of 
shortsighted consumers might reduce the signifi cance of the announcement 
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effect. Leeper et al. (2008) analyse the diffi culties that fi scal foresight in-
troduces in the estimation and interpretation of conventional analyses of 
fi scal shocks; even though they show that not accounting for anticipation 
effects might distort the interpretation of net taxes’ shocks,15 they also hint 
that under certain circumstances foresight might not impinge on the identi-
fi cation of other shocks, like government spending shocks. However, Yang 
(2007) argues that including lagged interest rates and prices leads to lower 
responses to tax shocks in that lagged interest rates and prices contain infor-
mation about macroeconomic variables related to current tax changes. Thus, 
the inclusion of prices and interest rate in our VAR might help assuage the 
foresight problem. 
Finally, Favero and Giavazzi (2007) argue that the omission of public 
debt in the VAR leads to biased results as they fail to take into account the 
debt dynamics that arises after a fi scal shock and, more importantly, over-
look the possibility of taxes and spending responding to the level of debt. 
We address this issue and include debt (changes in debt) in a similar way 
as Favero and Giavazzi in Burriel et al. (2010). 
IV. THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND TAX SHOCKS
IV.1. Interpreting the fi scal shocks
Figure 1 represents the fi scal shocks that we estimate in our baseline 
VAR for the EMU. In general, the largest fi scal shocks tend to be associated 
with episodes of discretionary government actions. Beginning with spend-
ing, negative shocks in public spending are found throughout the period 
1994-1997 related to the fi scal consolidation episodes previous to the euro 
adoption, as the decision whether or not a country entering EMU was taken 
on the basis of the fi scal defi cit recorded in 1997. We identify also positive 
shocks in 1990-1991 associated with the German reunifi cation process that 
was followed by a signifi cant increase in public spending. In the case of net 
revenue, we estimate positive residuals along the years 1995-1997, related 
also to the fi scal consolidation process previous to the EMU accession.
15. See also Yang (2005).
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Figure 1
Estimated shocks to fi scal variables
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The lines indicate the one standard deviation band width.
IV.2. The baseline VAR
Figure 2 displays the responses of the endogenous variables to a posi-
tive expenditure shock.16 Firstly, after a spending shock, GDP increases and 
remains signifi cant for fi ve quarters, becoming non-signifi cant thereafter. 
This result is largely in line with previous evidence for the US and other 
countries. In general, government spending shocks are found to yield posi-
tive output responses in the short-term (Perotti, 2004; Neri, 2001; Mountford 
and Uhlig, 2009), although the size and persistence of output multipliers 
varies signifi cantly across studies.17
16. Impulse responses show deviations with respect to the baseline to a one-percent shock of the 
relevant fi scal variable. Hence, GDP responses cannot be directly interpreted as output multipliers.
17. Caldara and Kamps (2008) show that, after controlling for differences in the specifi cation
of the reduced form model, all identifi cation approaches used in the literature yield qualitatively and 
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As for the impact of a government spending shock on the other vari-
ables in the system, prices increase with respect to the baseline, leading to a 
hump-shaped response of infl ation. Despite being a rather intuitive and, on 
the other hand, expected result, previous evidence is far from conclusive. 
For example, Fatás and Mihov (2001) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009) fi nd 
negative effects on prices and infl ation, whereas in the case of Marcellino 
(2006) the impact found is not signifi cant in the case of Germany, Spain 
and Italy and positive in the case of France. In turn, Perotti (2004) reports 
mixed evidence depending on the country and period under consideration. 
Likewise, the long-term interest rate rises in response to the shock and re-
mains signifi cant for more than 2 years.18 
Cumulative multipliers19 to expenditure shocks are shown in Table 
Output multipliers are rather low, slightly below 1 in the fi rst year follow-
ing the shock, diminishing thereafter and becoming non-signifi cant from the 
third year onwards. Such low multipliers are indicative of sizeable crowd-
ing-out effects.
On the other hand, our output multipliers are signifi cantly larger than 
those reported in Perotti (2004) for the US, using a sample covering the 
period 1980-2000. However, if our sample period is restricted until 2000, 
we obtain multipliers for the EMU very similar to those obtained by Perotti. 
Thus, our larger output multipliers seem to be due to what has happened 
between 2000 and 2007. Actually, Figure 3 shows that recursive output 
multipliers have increased steadily since 2000, especially at the 4th and 
8th quarters after the shock. The cause of this result may be related to the 
“global saving glut” which might have caused a decrease in global risks 
premia, diminishing the crowding-out effects of fi scal policy on private in-
vestment.20 However, this fact remains an open question that might deserve 
further research in the future.
quantitatively very similar results for government spending shocks. By contrast, they fi nd strongly 
diverging results for the effects of tax shocks. These differences stem from differences in the size of 
the automatic stabilisers estimated or calibrated under alternative identifi cation approaches.
18. In the literature, the impact of expansionary government spending shocks on interest rates
tends to be positive, although rather small (see for instance Perotti, 2004).
19. The cumulative multiplier at a given quarter is obtained as the ratio of the cumulative re-
sponse of GDP and the cumulative response of government expenditure at that quarter.
20. Laubach (2009) analyses the effects of public defi cits and debt on interest rates and fi nds
that the relationship between defi cits and interest rates turns from positive to negative in the period 
after 1999:Q1.
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Figure 2
Responses to an increase in government spending
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Table 1
Cumulative output multipliers
Quarters
1 4 8 12 16 20
EMU 81-07
Government spending 0.75 * 0.87 * 0.85 * 0.61 0.26 0.02 
Net taxes -0.79 * -0.63 * -0.49 -0.49 -0.58 -0.74
Note: the asterisks indicate signifi cance within the one-standard deviation band-width.
Figure 3
Recursive output multipliers to government spending shocks
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The responses to net-tax shocks are depicted in Figure 4. Specifi cally, 
GDP falls on impact in response to net-tax increases in the EMU, but the 
GDP response remains signifi cant for only three quarters. Likewise, prices, 
and consequently infl ation, fall in the quarters following the shock, presum-
ably due to lower demand pressures and interest rates fall on impact, al-
though the response become non-signifi cant three quarters after the shock. 
Finally, government expenditure eventually falls. In turn, output multipliers 
turn out to be negative and lower in absolute value than government spend-
ing output multipliers when signifi cant (see again Table 1). 
As in the case of spending shocks, these results are qualitatively similar 
to the fi ndings in previous studies. In general, many empirical papers fi nd that 
tax multipliers are lower than spending ones in the short-term, which is con-
sistent with the theoretical prediction that part of the higher disposable income 
stemming from tax cuts is saved. This is the case in Blanchard and Perotti 
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(2002) and Mountfourd and Uhlig (2009). However, some evidence suggests 
that in the longer term tax multipliers could be higher than spending multipli-
ers. Additional changes in the model specifi cation, alternative variables and a 
broader sensitivity analysis of the results can be found in Burriel et al. (2010).
Figure 4
Responses to an increase in net taxes
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V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper contributes to previous literature analysing the effects of 
fi scal policy for the euro area as a whole, employing a new database that 
contains quarterly fi scal variables. 
In line with previous evidence, we fi nd that GDP and infl ation in-
crease in response to government spending shocks, although output multi-
pliers are below unity. However, we provide evidence of output multipliers 
increasing steadily after 2000 in the EMU, possibly related to the “global 
saving glut”. In turn, net-tax increases weight on economic activity, with the 
negative response being short-lived. In line with previous studies, we fi nd 
that tax multipliers are lower than spending ones in the short-term. 
VI. APPENDIX A:
CONSTRUCTION OF OUTPUT AND PRICE ELASTICITIES
In order to calculate the output and price elasticities we basically fol-
low the OECD methodology proposed in Giorno et al. (1995), which fo-
cuses on four tax categories, i.e. personal income tax, corporate income tax, 
indirect taxes and social security contributions. In addition, they consider 
the elasticity of transfer programmes, notably unemployment benefi ts. On 
this issue, in more general terms see Golinelli and Momigliano (2009) for a 
survey of the cyclical response of fi scal policies.
According to this methodology, the output elasticity of the personal 
income tax can be obtained as:
(A.1)
where εtdirh,w is the elasticity of personal income tax revenues to earnings, 
measured by the compensation per employee, εw,emp is the employment 
elasticity of the real wage and εemp,y 
the GDP elasticity of employment. 
Analogously, the output elasticity of social security contributions is:
 (A.2)
with εss,w being the elasticity of social contributions to earnings. 
The output elasticity of corporate income tax revenues stems from:
 (A.3)
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where εtdirc,gos is the elasticity of tax revenues to the gross operating surplus 
and εgos,y the output elasticity of the gross operating surplus. In the same 
fashion, given that the main tax base for indirect tax collections is private 
consumption, the output elasticity of indirect taxes is obtained as:
           (A.4)
where εtdind,c and εc,y are the private consumption elasticity of indirect taxes 
and the output elasticity of private consumption, respectively.
Since we employ data on a national accounts basis, collection lags should 
not affect the elasticities to the respective tax-bases signifi cantly. Hence, 
these have been taken from van den Noord (2000) and Bouthevillain et 
al. (2001). The output elasticities of the relevant tax bases were, however, 
obtained from econometric estimation on a quarterly basis. In general, the 
general equation used for estimating these elasticities was:
(A.5)
where Bi is the relevant tax base for the ith tax category and εi is the output 
elasticity of such tax base. These equations, given the likely contemporane-
ous correlation between the independent variable and the error term, were 
estimated by instrumental variables. However, if the variables Bi and Y are 
cointegrated, (A.5) contains a specifi cation error. In this case, the following 
ECM specifi cation would be preferable:
(A.6)
where λ measures the long-term contemporaneous elasticity we are inter-
ested in. 
Information on the output elasticity of net transfers is more limited 
than in the former cases. Although unemployment benefi ts respond to the 
underlying economic conditions, many expenditure programmes do not have 
built-in conditions that make them respond contemporaneously to employ-
ment or output. Therefore, recalling Perotti’s argument, an output elasticity 
of net transfers of -0.2 has been assumed. 
As for price elasticities, following van der Noord (2000) the elastic-
ity of direct taxes paid by households, corporate income taxes and social 
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contributions were obtained as εtdirh,p = εtdirh,p -1 (yielding 0.9), εtdirc,p = εtdirc,gos -1 
(with a value equal to 0) and εss,p = εss,w -1 (being -0.1), respectively. Indirect 
taxes are typically proportional. Hence, following Perotti (2004), a zero price 
elasticity was assumed. Finally, although transfer programmes are indexed 
to the CPI, indexation occurs with a considerable lag. Thus, the price elastic-
ity of transfers was set to -1. Table A.1 shows the resulting output and price 
elasticities.
Table A.1.
Output and price elasticities of net taxes 
EMU
εtdirh,w 2.0
εw,emp 0.65
εemp,y 0.39
εss,w 1.0
εtdirc,gos 1.0
εgos,y 1.08
εc,y 0.97
εtind,c 1.0
Output elasticities
εtdirh,y 0.90
εss,y 0.64
εtdirc,y 1.08
εtind,y 0.97
εtransf,y -0.2
εt,y 1.54
Price elasticities
εtdir,p 1.0
εss,p 0.0
εtind,p 0.0
εtransf,p -1.0
εt,p 1.14
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